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Contrary to Sargent and Wallace (1975), a central bank’s use of an interest-rate instrument does 
determine prices when the central bank pursues either a short-term or long-term price target.  
However, in order for a central bank’s pursuit of a long-term price target to be credible, the 
public still needs something like a Taylor or McCallum-Woodford rule.  The use of an interest-
rate instrument also determines prices when the central bank targets nominal income in either the 
short-term or long-term.  However, if the central bank targets interest rates in the short term with 
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Price Indeterminacy Reinvented: 
Pegging Interest Rates While Targeting Prices, Inflation, or Nominal Income 
 
I.  Introduction 
This paper revisits the issue of price indeterminacy of pegging the interest rate as 
discussed by Sargent and Wallace (1975).  Sargent and Wallace applied rational expectations to 
what McCallum (1981) called a “rather orthodox IS-LM-NRPC model”.
1  Under short-term price 
targeting, they concluded that if a central bank uses the interest rate as its instrument, prices are 
indeterminate.  Based on Eagle and Murff’s (2004) revision of the procedures to solve 
expectational difference equations, this paper finds otherwise.  Under the same model Sargent 
and Wallace analyzed and under their same assumptions, this paper finds that a central bank 
using the interest-rate as its instrument does determine prices when the central bank targets 
prices each period as assumed by Sargent and Wallace. 
Crucial to this paper’s different conclusion is in the logic of infinity.  Eagle and Murff 
(2004) argue against the rational expectations precedent of assuming the solution is bounded.  In 
particular, they review the history of that precedent and find the foundations of that precedent to 
be less than rigorous and they show several finance and infinitely-repeated-game examples 
where that precedent leads to erroneous conclusions.  Instead, they recommend that one solve 
expectational difference equations by determining the terminal condition in a model with a finite 
horizon and then taking the limit of that terminal condition as the horizon goes to infinity.  Doing 
that in the model analyzed by Sargent and Wallace forces the central bank in the last period to 
                                                 
1 The NRPC stands for “Natural-Rate Phillips Curve.” - 2 - 
use money as its instrument as no interest rate exists in that last period.  This does lead to price 
determination even though the interest rate is used as the instrument for all the preceding periods. 
However, to some extent, this paper’s different conclusion is just a theoretical 
technicality.  While the expected future prices are determined in the model, the public’s 
confidence in those expected future prices may diminish to zero as the horizon goes to infinity 
unless the pegging of the interest rate is combined with some policy such as a McCallum-
Woodford rule or a Taylor rule.  Thus, the basic policy implications are essentially the same as in 
the previous literature that was based on the flawed rational expectations precedent of solving 
expectational difference equations. 
This paper does, nevertheless, bring new realizations relevant to policy.  In particular, 
this paper finds that short-term interest-rate targeting combined with long-term targeting of 
prices or nominal income does determine prices.  However, short-term interest-rate targeting 
combined with long-term inflation targeting leads to price indeterminacy even under Eagle and 
Murff’s revised procedures for solving expectational difference equations.  This result provides 
support for central banks targeting prices or nominal income in the long term rather than 
inflation. 
In an attempt to avoid confusion, this paper uses the word “target” to represent either a 
short-term or long-term measurable objective that the central bank pursues.  A target in this 
paper may differ from the term “instrument”, which refers to what the central bank uses to 
achieve its target.  While Sargent and Wallace only looked at short-term price targeting, this 
paper analyzes price determinacy under price targeting, nominal-income targeting, and inflation 
targeting.  In addition to considering these as short-term targets, this paper also considers 
scenarios where these goals are the longer-term targets with the short-term target being the - 3 - 
interest rate itself.  Therefore, this paper uses the term “interest-rate targeting” to refer to when 
the short-term target is the interest rate; the long-term objective may then be to target prices, 
nominal income, or inflation.  However, if the central bank’s short-term objective is to target 
prices, nominal income, or inflation, this paper uses the term “pegging the interest rate” not the 
term “targeting the interest rate.” 
The next section, section II, presents the model analyzed by Sargent and Wallace and 
shows that prices are determined when the central bank targets prices in the short term using the 
interest rate as its instrument.  Section III discusses how the public’s confidence in the expected 
future prices may diminish to zero unless the interest-rate pegging is combined with a 
sufficiently strong McCallum-Woodford or Taylor rule.  Section IV shows that pegging the 
interest rate also determines prices when the central bank’s short-term target is nominal income 
or inflation.  Section V looks at price determinacy when a central bank targets interest rates in 
the short run and in the long-run targets prices, nominal income, or inflation.  Section VI 
summarizes and reflects on the implications of this paper’s results. 
 
II. The IS-LM-NRPC Model and Price Determinacy of Pegging the Interest Rate 
  Sargent and Wallace present five equations for the IS-LM-NRPC model they analyze.  
However, we need only concern ourselves with the following three: 
t t t t t t u p E p a k a y 1 1 2 1 1 ]) [ ( + - + = - -   (1) 
( ) t t t t t t t t t u Z b p E p E i b k b y 2 3 1 1 1 2 1 1 ] [ ] [ ( + + - - - = - + - -
￿ ￿
  (2) 
t t t t t u i c y c p m 3 2 1 + - + =   (3) - 4 - 
I have rewritten these equations so all coefficients are positive, except  3 b
￿
, which is a vector of 
unspecified coefficients.
2  “Here yt, pt, and mt are the natural logarithms of output, the price 
level, and the money supply, respectively” (Sargent and Wallace, 2003, p. 243).  I use it to 
represent the nominal interest rate (not its logarithm).  The variables  t t t u u u 3 2 1   and   ,   , are 
stochastic exogenous terms that need not have zero means.  The variable kt represents 
productivity, which is determined by Sargent and Wallace’s equation (4), which I do not 
reproduce here.  All other exogenous variables are represented in the vector variable  t Z
￿
. 
  To simplify these equations, define  ] [ 1 1 1 1 t t t t u E k a y - - + º ,  ] [ 1 1 1 t t t u E u - º e , 
2
2 1 1 3 1 1 ] [ ] [
b
u E Z E b y k b
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t t t t t t
t
- - - + + -
º
￿ ￿
,  and  ( ) ] [ ] [ 2 1 2 1 3 2 t t t t t t t u E u Z E Z b - - - + - º
￿ ￿ ￿
e .  We can 
then rewrite equations (2) and (1) respectively as: 
( ) ( ) t t t t t t t t t p E p E r i b y y 2 1 1 1 2 ] [ ] [ e + - - - - = - + -   (4) 
t t t t t t p E p a y y 1 1 2 ]) [ ( e + - + = -   (5) 
where the error terms  t 1 e  and  t 2 e  have zero expected values. 
  While the points made in this paper could probably be made in terms of (3), (4), and (5) 
without any modification and by referring to equation (3) as the money demand function, I as the 
author cannot do so without continuing some logical errors other economists have made 
previously.  Appendix B discusses these errors, which include theoretical identification errors 
and a fallacy of confusing velocity and the money demand function. 
Note that (4) is supposed to be the aggregate-demand function.  However, by using yt to 
represent both real aggregate demand and real aggregate supply, equations (3), and (4) are 
                                                 
2 Also, here I used rationally expected values for all unknown values.  I have also taken the liberty to represent the 
nominal interest rate as it instead of rt. - 5 - 
already a mixture of equilibrium conditions with structural equations and are therefore already 
reduced forms.  As the appendix discusses, economists can make theoretical identification errors 
when treating reduced forms as though they are structural equations.  Therefore, I consider it 
important to separate out equilibrium conditions from these equations.  Also, separating out the 
equilibrium conditions will make it easier later in this paper to analyze nominal-income 
targeting. 
Let yt represent the natural logarithm of real aggregate supply, and let nt represent the 
natural logarithm of nominal aggregate demand.  The equilibrium of the goods market is 
determined by the interaction of nominal aggregate demand and aggregate supply.  In particular, 
the equilibrium price level should equal nominal aggregate demand divided by aggregate supply.  
In logarithmic terms, this means that  t t t y n p - = .  Equation (4) is supposed to be the aggregate 
demand curve.  Therefore, to separate the goods market equilibrium condition from (4), we need 
to replace yt with  t t p n - .  Doing so gives us: 
( ) ( ) t t t t t t t t t t p E p E r i b y p n 2 1 1 1 2 ] [ ] [ e + - - - - + = - + -   (6) 
Next we need to separate out the goods market equilibrium condition from (3).  How we 
do that depends whether we consider (3) to represent the money demand function or the 
structural velocity function.  If we look at (3) as the money demand function consistent with the 
microeconomic definition of a demand function, then we would leave (3) as it stands as being a 
function of aggregate supply.  However, that would imply a very complex structural velocity 
function that would be hard to justify.  Instead, even though many economists refer to (3) as the 
money demand function, I interpret it to be the structural velocity function, which is the 
relationship between money and nominal aggregate demand.  The structural velocity function - 6 - 
differs from the inverse of the money demand function as explained in Appendix B.  Using that 
interpretation, I separate (3) from the goods market equilibrium condition by rewriting it as: 
t t t t t u i c y c m n 3 2 1) 1 ( - + - + =   (7) 
where  t t t u i c y c 3 2 1) 1 ( - + -  is the natural logarithm of the structural velocity of money.
3 
  Given that we have extracted the goods market equilibrium condition from equations (3) 
and (4), we now need to include in our model the goods market equilibrium condition: 
t t t y n p - =   (8) 
Equation (8) means that the goods market instantaneously moves to equilibrium.  While we 
maintain that assumption, some interesting extensions of the model would include replacing (8) 
with  t t t y n p - = +1  or with  ) ( ) 1 ( 1 t t t t y n p p - + - = - a a  for some a between 0 and 1.  For these 
extensions, the separating out the equilibrating condition from the aggregate demand and 
structural velocity functions is clearly important. 
  One of the advantages of having separated out the goods market equilibrium condition 
from (3) and (4) is that we can see more clearly how prices are determined in the model.  The 
price level is determined by equation (8), the equilibrium condition between nominal aggregate 
demand and real aggregate supply.  Some literature, e.g., Woodford (2003), has lost sight of the 
importance of nominal aggregate demand in determining the price level. 
  The model with which we are working consists of equations (5), (6), (7), and (8).  Also, 
included in the model are the definitional equations for  t t t t y r 2 1   and   ,   ,   , e e and Sargent and 
Wallace’s equations (4) and (5) which explain the evolution of variables affecting  t t y r   and   , .  
                                                 
3 If we defined vt to be the natural logarithm of the structural velocity, then nt=mt+vt.  If we do interpret (3) as the 
inverse of the structural velocity function, then an issue exists as to whether the term t y c ) 1 ( 1 -  before the 
separating out of the equilibrium condition refers to aggregate supply or aggregate demand or some combination of - 7 - 
This is the same model as used by Sargent and Wallace, except I am being more precise by 
separating the goods-market equilibrium condition from the aggregate demand equation and the 
structural velocity equation. 
Please note that, while equations (5), (6), (7), and (8) are structural equations of the 
model, they still imply the reduced-form equations (3) and (4), which we may therefore reference 
when convenient to do so. 
  By taking expectations of (4) and (5) given the information set at time t-1, we obtain 
( ) ( ) ] [ ] [ ( ] [ ] [ 1 1 1 1 2 1 t t t t t t t t t t p E p E r i E b y y E - + - - - - - - - =  and  t t t y y E = - ] [ 1 ,  which together imply: 
] [ ] [ ] [ 1 1 1 1 t t t t t t t p E p E r i E - + - - - + = ,  (9) 
Equation (9) is basically a Fisher equation and is equivalent to Sargent and Wallace’s equation 
(26).
4  As did Sargent and Wallace, we assume homogenous expectations which means that the 
bank is transparent in how it sets the interest rate and that the public and the central bank have 
the same expectations.  Furthermore, we assume the central bank is transparent in how it sets the 
interest rate.  Since the central bank pegs the interest rate based on its (and the public’s) 
expectations at time t-1, the public knows at time t-1 what interest rate the central bank will peg 
at time t.  Let  t i ~  be the interest rate the central bank sets at time t.  Then  t t t i i E ~ ] [ 1 = - .  Therefore, 
substituting (9) for  t i  in (4) and simplifying gives: 
t t t y y 2 e + =   (10) 









+ = -   (11) 
                                                                                                                                                             
both.  To be honest, I chose this term to refer to aggregate supply because I thought it would be the simplest 
assumption with which to work.  - 8 - 
This shows that if we can determine  ] [ 1 t t p E - , then  t p  will also be determined. 
Sargent and Wallace assumed that the central bank tried to minimize a loss function of 
the weighted squared deviations of output and prices from their targets.  Since Sargent and 
Wallace show that monetary policy under rational expectations cannot affect expected output, 
the central bank’s only remaining goal is to minimize the squared deviations of prices from the 
price targets.  While they assumed one constant price target regardless of the time period, this 
paper allows the price targets to vary over time.  Let 
*
t p  be the central bank’s targeted price level 
for time t, which is known by the public.  Therefore, under Sargent and Wallace’s assumptions, 



















t p p E d  where  1 0 < < d .  This loss 
function would create some complex issues for us to deal that are mostly just distractions from 
what we are trying to do.  We can simplify our task considerably by replacing this loss function 













t p p E d   (12) 
  By changing the form of this loss function, some may say that I have “cheated” by 
changing an assumption made by Sargent and Wallace.  However, all I am doing is changing an 
assumption slightly to be consistent with Sargent and Wallace’s statement on page 249, in 
reference to their equations (24) and (25), where they stated that the value of  ] [ 1 t t p E -  that 
minimizes the central bank’s loss function equals the targeted price level.  While that is true for 
the loss function (11), it is not necessarily true for the loss function Sargent and Wallace actually 
assumed.  This is a technicality that the Appendix A discusses further. 
                                                                                                                                                             
4 This is the equivalent of Sargent and Wallace’s (26), except their (26) had a minor error.  The last term in their (26) - 9 - 
  The central bank minimizes (11) by choosing its policy instrument so that 
*
1 ] [ t t t p p E = - .  
Having rational expectations, the public knows that 
*
1 ] [ t t t p p E = - .  Since 
*




1 1 1 1 1 1 ] [ ]] [ [ ] [ + + - + - + - = = = t t t t t t t t p p E p E E p E .  Therefore, we do not need to solve any difference 
equations to obtain values for  ] [ 1 t t p E -  and  ] [ 1 1 + - t t p E .  All we have to do is figure out what 
interest rates the central bank needs to peg to get 
*
1 ] [ t t t p p E = -  for all t.  This is the logic behind 
Proposition 1 below: 
Proposition 1: If the central bank follows interest-rate targeting, then the only rational 
expectations equilibrium where the central bank achieves its target 
*
1 ] [ t t t p p E = -  for all time t is 
where the following conditions hold: 
(a) the central bank sets the interest rate at each time t to equal: 
* *
1 t t t t p p r i - + = +   (13) 








+ =   (14) 
(c) 
*
1 ] [ t t t p p E = -  for all t, and  
(d) the money supply for each time t equals: 
( ) t t t t t t
t t




1 2 2 1
2
1 2 * ) ( + - + - + +
-
+ = + e
e e
  (15) 
Proof:  Replacing 
*
t p  for  ] [ 1 t t p E -  and 
*
1 + t p  for  ] [ 1 1 + - t t p E  in (9) gives (13), which proves 
part (a). Substituting 
*
t p  for  ] [ 1 t t p E -  in (11) gives (14), which proves point (b). Taking 
expectations of (14) based on the information set at time t-1 gives 
*
1 ] [ t t t p p E = -  for all t, 
which proves point (c).  Now, into (3), substitute (14) for  t p , (10) for yt, and (13) for it to 
get (15) which proves point (d).  Q.E.D. 
                                                                                                                                                             
should have been  ] [ 2 1 3 1 t t t t u u Z b E + - - . - 10 - 
 
While proposition 1 states that the only rational expectations equilibrium that is 
consistent with the central bank achieving its objective of 
*
1 ] [ t t t p p E = -  for all t, an issue of 
uniqueness remains to be proven.  We need to determine whether other rational expectations 
equilibria where 
*
1 ] [ t t t p p E ¹ -  for some t exist that are consistent with interest rates set by (13). 




+ + - - - - - =
1
0
1 1 1 ] ~ [ ] [ ] [
t T
j
j t j t t T t t t r i E p E p E   (16) 
Equation (16) is essentially the same as Sargent and Wallace’s equation (27), where they 
concluded that they could not solve for the expected price levels and therefore concluded that 
prices were indeterminate.  Later, Sargent (1979) established a precedent of assuming the 
solution is bounded when solving forward expectational difference equations.  However, Eagle 
and Murff (2004) show that the foundation for this precedent is less than rigorous and present 
several finance and infinitely-repeated-game examples where this precedent leads to incorrect 
solutions.  They suggest that we follow Sargent’s (1979, pp. 195-200) example of assuming a 
version of the model with a finite horizon to determine the appropriate terminal condition and 
then taking the limit of that condition as the horizon goes to infinity.  This paper follows that 
approach. 
Assume the last period of the economy is period T.  In period T, no one can borrow or 
lend funds and there is no interest rate because there is no next period for the loans to be settled.  
With no interest rate, the central bank has no choice but to use the money supply as its 
instrument at time T.  With no interest rate to affect velocity, the structural velocity function at 
time T must be: 
T T T T u y c m n 3 1) ~ 1 ( - - + =   (17) - 11 - 
where  1
~ c  is the coefficient on  T y  which could be a different parameter from c1.  To achieve its 
objective of obtaining 
*
1 ] [ T T T p p E = - , the central bank would set  ] [ ~
3 1 1
*
T T T T T u E y c p m - + + = .  
Substituting this value for mT into (17) after taking expectations given the information set at time 
T-1 gives  ( ) ] [ ) ~ 1 ( ] [ ~ ] [ 3 1 1 3 1 1
*
1 T T T T T T T T T u E y c u E y c p n E - - - - - + + + = , which means that 
T T T T y p n E + = -
*
1 ] [ .  Since  T T T T T y n E p E - = - - ] [ ] [ 1 1  by (8), this implies that 
*
1 ] [ T T T p p E = - .  
Also,  [ ]
* *
1 1 1 1 ] [ ] [ ] [ T T t T T t T t p p E p E E p E = = = - - - - . 
Substitute 
*










1 ] [ ] [
t T
j
j t j t j t j t t T t t r p p r E p p E , which implies that  
*
1 ] [ t t t p p E = - .  Since this 
is true for all t, we conclude that the expected prices are uniquely determined and hence prices 
are uniquely determined.  When we let the economy’s horizon T approach infinity, this 
uniqueness is maintained.  This then establishes that the equilibrium described in Proposition 1 is 
unique. 
 
III. The Public Confidence Issue 
While following Eagle and Murff’s (2004) precedent for solving expectational difference 
equations does lead to the conclusion that expected future prices and hence prices are 
determined, solving expectational difference equations says nothing about the public’s 
confidence in those expected prices.  This section discusses this confidence issue.  Normally, 
one’s confidence in an expected value decreases the further into the future that the random 
variable occurs.  (Another way of saying this is that the size of a confidence interval becomes 
greater the further into the future the variable occurs.) - 12 - 
Applying the assumption of rational expectations to the public with respect to their price 
expectations means the public knows what the central bank is trying to do. If the public knows 
with certainty that the central bank will target prices when period T occurs, and that that price 
target will be 
*
T p , then the public’s confidence that 
*
1 ] [ T T t p P E = -  will remain the same 
regardless how far in the future period T occurs.  However, while the public may be quite 
confident that the central bank is currently targeting prices, realistically they will be less 
confident that the central bank will target prices in the far distant future.  Even the central bank 
itself may have some doubts that it will target prices in the far distant future when the central 
bank will be under a different administration.  Furthermore, even if the central bank does target 
prices in the far distant future, both the public and the central bank’s confidence in what that 
price target will be will likely diminish the further in the future for which that price target 
applies.  Therefore, realistically, we should expect both the public and central bank’s confidence 
that 
*
1 ] [ T T t p P E = -  will diminish as T goes to infinity. 



























.  These derivatives imply that the importance of the terms  ] [ 1 T t P E -  and 
] ~ [ 1 j t j t t r i E + + - -  remain the same regardless the value of T or j.  However, if the confidence in 
] [ 1 T t P E -  and  ] ~ [ 1 j t j t t r i E + + - -  decrease the greater is T and the greater is j, then the public’s 
confidence in  ] [ 1 t t p E -  will decrease the greater is T.  In the limit the public’s confidence could 
decrease to zero as T goes to infinity.  A zero confidence in  ] [ 1 t t p E -  would correspond to an 
infinite variance of pt conditional on the information set at time t-1.  While some statistical 
distributions do result in finite means and infinite variances, the usefulness of the  ] [ 1 t t p E -  when - 13 - 
the variance is infinite may be questionable.  If so, then the implications of Sargent and 
Wallace’s original indeterminacy result may still apply even though in some technical sense, 
prices are determined when pegging the interest rate. 
Instead of (13), suppose the central bank sets its interest rate to the following: 
) ] [ ( ~ *
1
* *
1 t t t t t t t p p E p p r i - + - + = - + j   (18) 
where j is a positive constant.  Equation (18), which is similar to a McCallum-Woodford rule 
(See McCallum, 1981, and Woodford, 2003), states that the central bank will set the interest rate 
at a level higher (lower) than (13) when the public and central bank
5 expect this period’s price 
level to be higher (lower) than the central bank’s target. 






1 1 1 ] [ 1 ] [ t t t t t t p p E p p E - + + = - + + - j   (19) 


















1   (20) 
Following Eagle and Murff’s (2004) revised procedures for solving expectational 
difference equations, we would once again have the central bank setting the money supply in 
period T to try to get the expected price level equal to its target.  Taking the partial derivative of 
























, which means that the weight on the terminal expected price 
decreases to zero as the horizon goes to zero. 
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ] [ 1 1 1 t t t t E p E r - + - + -
 
] [ ] [
*
1 1 1 1 t t t t t p p E p E - + = + - + -
 
( )( 1 ] [
*




1 [ ) ] [ ( 1 - - = - + t t t t E p p E j
 
 









 - 14 - 
Let  ) ( 1 T t p - s  represent the standard deviation at time t-1 of the price level at time T in 
the mind of the public.  The public’s confidence that 
*
1 ] [ T T t p p E = -  should be inversely related 
to  ) ( 1 T t p - s .  It may very well be the case that  ) ( 1 T t p - s  increases as T increases.  However, by 
















, then the McCallum-Woodford rule 
offsets the decrease in the public’s confidence that 
*
1 ] [ T T t p p E = -  as T goes to infinity.  
Furthermore, the act of the central bank following (18) means that the central bank takes steps 
each period to control inflation rather than waiting until period T to undertake that control.  From 
signaling theory, these steps should even further boost the public’s confidence in the central 
bank. 






1 ] [ ~
t t t t t t t E p p r i p p g - + - + = - +   (21) 




- - º t t t p p p .  This is similar to a Taylor rule (See Taylor, 1993).  
Equating (9) to (21), replacing  ] [ ] [ 1 1 1 t t t t p E p E - + - -  with  ] [ 1 1 + - t t E p , replacing 
* *
1 t t p p - +  with 
*





1 1 1 ] [ ] [ t t t t t t E E p p g p p - + = - + + -  


















] [   (22) 
                                                                                                                                                             
5 As did Sargent and Wallace (1975), we assume homogenous expectations, which means that the public and the 
central bank have the same expectations. - 15 - 
At time T, the central bank would set the money supply so that 
*
1 ] [ T T T p p E = - , and it 
would set the interest rate at time T-1 according to (21), which determines  ] [ 2 T T E p -  and hence 
] [ 1 T t E p - .  Also as before, the public’s confidence in the value of  ] [ 1 T t E p -  may diminish as T 
goes to infinity.  Let  ) ( 1 T t p s -  be the standard deviation of inflation at time T in the public’s 










, this Taylor rule offsets the 
public’s diminishing confidence in  ] [ 1 T t E p -  as T goes to infinity. 
Pegging the interest rate determines prices in a technical sense when we revise Sargent 
and Wallace’s (1975) analysis to reflect Eagle and Murff’s (2004) revised procedures for solving 
expectational differences.  However, when we take into account the public’s confidence in the 
central bank, the policy implications are very similar to what the previous literature has 
discussed.  The use of a McCallum-Woodford rule or a Taylor rule may offset this diminishing 
public confidence in the central bank in the long run resulting with greater confidence in 
expected prices in the near term. 
 
IV. Price Determinacy Under Short-Term Nominal-Income and Inflation Targeting 
The previous two sections discuss price determinacy when the central bank uses the 
interest rate as its monetary instrument as it pursues a short-term price target.  Worldwide, 
however, central banks are moving toward inflation targeting.  Also, Eagle and Domian (2003 
and 2004) use Pareto-efficiency arguments to argue in favor of nominal-income targeting.  This 
section sketches how the price-determinacy issue is affected by the central bank pursuing a short-
term inflation or nominal-income target. - 16 - 























t E E p p d , it will do so when 
*
1 ] [ t t t E p p = -  for all t.  By (9), the central bank 




+ + = t t t r i p .  Since  1 - + = t t t p p p ,  1
*
1 ] [ - - + = t t t t p p E p , and 










+ + = -   (23) 
Expected prices and prices will be determined.  However, once again something like a Taylor 






1 ] [ ~
t t t t t t E r i p p g p - + + = - +   (24) 
for a g  sufficiently greater than 1. 























t n n E E d  where 
*
t n  represents the targeted level of nominal aggregate demand.  
The central bank minimizes its loss function when 
*
1 ] [ t t t n n E = -  for all t.  Taking expectations of 
(8) given the information set at time t-1 gives  t t t t y n p E - = -
*
1 ] [ .  By (9), the central bank sets 
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+ - =  - 17 - 
A rule like a McCallum-Woodford rule may be needed to firm up the public’s confidence in their 
expected prices.  Below I present a McCallum-Woodford-like rule modified to work with 
nominal income targeting:  





1 t t t t t t t t t t n n E y n y E n r i - + - - - + = - + - + j   (25) 
This states that the central bank will set the interest rate higher (lower) if the public’s 
expectations of nominal aggregate demand exceeds (falls short of) the nominal-income target. 
  Setting (9) equal to (25), replacing  ] [ 1 1 + - t t p E  with ( ) ] [ ] [ 1 1 1 1 + - + - - t t t t y E n E , replacing  










1 1 1 ] [ 1 ] [ t t t t t t n n E n n E - + = - - + + + j  



















The central bank will set the money supply at time T.  Let  ) ( 1 T t n - s  be the standard 
deviation of the public’s expectation of nT.  If the parameter j is set sufficiently greater than zero 














, then the public should be relatively confident that 
*
1 ] [ t t t n n E = - . 
 
V. Price Determinacy Under Short-Term Interest-Rate Targeting 
The central bank in the previous sections had short-term targets of the price level, 
inflation, or nominal income.  However, in the real world, central banks rarely target these in the 
short term.  Instead, in the short term, they target interest rates, reserves, or some other monetary 
instrument and then in the intermediate-term or long-term make adjustments to meet their long-
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ( ] [ 1 1 t t t t E n E r - + - + -
 
(1 ] [ ] [
*
1 1 1 1 t t t t t n n E n E + - + - - = -
 
( ) 1 ] [
* *
1 1 1 t t t t n n n E + + - + + - = j
 















 - 18 - 
term goals concerning prices, inflation, or nominal income.  This section analyzes price 
determinacy when the central bank targets the interest rate in the short term and in the long run 
targets the price level, inflation, or nominal income.  In this section, we no longer look at T as 
being the horizon of the economy.  Rather assume T>2 and the central bank targets the interest 
rate for t=1,2,…,T-1.  At time T, the central bank sets its monetary instrument so to meet its 
long-term goal.  The central bank could do that using the money supply.  It could also do it with 
the interest rate at time T set with a McCallum-Woodford rule or a Taylor rule. 
First consider long-term price targeting.  Then the central bank will choose its monetary 
instrument at time T so that 
*
1 ] [ T T t p p E = - .
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j t j t t T t
e e -
+ - - = ￿
- -
=
+ + -   (26) 
This means that prices are determined when the central bank targets interest rates for a 
short-term period followed by targeting prices at time T. 
Next consider nominal income targeting in the long run.  The central bank would set its 
monetary instrument at time T so that 
*
1 ] [ T T T n n E = - , which implies that  T T T T y n p E - = -
*
1 ] [  by 
equation (8).  Taking expectations of both sides conditional on the information set at time t-1 
gives  ] [ ] [ 1
*
1 T t T T t y E n p E - - - = .  Substituting this into (16) gives: 
                                                 
6 In the real word, a central bank pursuing a long-term goal would not immediately force that goal to be realized, but 
would likely just start moving toward that goal.  However, in this model, the expected output is unaffected if the 
central bank moves immediately rather than slowly to meet that goal.   Therefore, we assume an immediate meeting 
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+ - - - = ￿
- -
=
+ + - -   (28) 
This shows that when the central bank targets nominal income for some finite period of time 
followed by it targeting nominal income in period T, prices are determined. 
Next, consider inflation targeting.  At time T, the central bank will set its monetary 
instrument so that 
*
1 ] [ T T T E p p = - , which implies that 
*
1 ] [ T T t E p p = - .  Since  1 - - º T T T p p p , this 
implies that  ] [ ] [ 1 1
*









1 ] ~ [ ] [ ] [
t T
j
j t j t t T t T t t r i E p E p E p   (29) 
If we apply (29) to t=T-1, we get: 
1 1 1 1 1
*
1 1 ] ~ [ ] [ ] [ - - - - - - - - - + = T T T T T T T T r i E p E p E p   (30) 
This is the equation that would determine  ] [ 1 1 - - T T p E  if it were determined.  However, since 
] [ 1 1 - - T T p E  is on both sides of the equation, they just cancel; resulting with  ] [ 1 1 - - T T p E  being 
undetermined.  If  ] [ 1 1 - - T T p E  is undetermined then all  ] [ 1 1 - - T t p E  are undetermined, which 
implies by (29) that  ] [ 1 t t p E -  is undetermined and hence prices are undetermined. 
  In conclusion short-term interest-rate targeting followed by inflation targeting at time T 
leads to price indeterminacy even according to Eagle and Murff’s revised procedures for solving 
expectational difference equations.  This results because if all the central bank cares about at 
time T is the inflation rate at time T, there are an uncountably infinite number of price sequences 
from time 1,2,…,T-1 that would be consistent with that targeted inflation rate at time T. - 20 - 
  Another way to see why prices are indeterminate when the central bank targets interest 
rates in the short run and the inflation rate at time T is to count equations.  If we apply (16) to 




+ + + + - - + - - - =
1
0
1 1 1 ] ~ [ ] [ ] [
k t T
j
k j t k j t t T t k t t r i E p E p E   (31) 
Equation (31) applies to k=0,1,2,…,T-t-1 , meaning there are T-t of these equations.  With either 
price targeting or nominal-income targeting,  ] [ 1 T t p E -  is determined so that the unknowns are 
] [ 1 k t t p E + -  for k=0,1,…,T-t-1, meaning there are T-t unknowns.  Since the number of equations 
equals the number of unknowns and each equation (31) expresses the unknown in terms of the 
known values, the prices are determined. 
  However, with inflation targeting  ] [ ] [ 1 1 1 - - - + = T t T T t p E p E p .  No longer is  ] [ 1 T t p E -  a 
function of known values.   We can rewrite this equation as: 
T T t T t p E p E p - = - - - ] [ ] [ 1 1 1   (32) 
Thus, we have T-t+1 unknowns, which are  ] [ 1 k t t p E + -  for k=0,1,…,T-t.  We also have T-t+1 
equations, which consist of (32) and the equations (31) for k=0,1,…,T-t.  Applying (31) to 
k=T-t-1 gives: 
j t T t T t T t r i E p E p E + - - - - - - = ] ~ [ ] [ ] [ 1 1 1 1   (33) 













.  Therefore, the Jacobian matrix of the functions that 
represent the equations is singular causing the prices to be indeterminate. 
  The Taylor rule (24) does not overcome this price indeterminacy because its correction 
factor is in terms of the inflation rate differing from the targeted rate of inflation.  On the other - 21 - 
hand, this is not an issue with the McCallum-Woodford rule since it is a rule consistent with 
price targeting not inflation targeting. 
 
VI. Summary and Reflections 
  This paper finds that pegging the interest rate does determine prices when the central 
bank targets the price level, nominal income, or inflation in the short term as well as the long 
term.  This conclusion differs from Sargent and Wallace (1975) because this paper follows Eagle 
and Murff’s (2004) revised procedures for solving expectational difference equations.  These 
procedures require us to consider the model with a finite horizon to determine the terminal 
condition and taking the limit of that terminal condition as the horizon goes to infinity.  Since no 
interest-rate exists in the last period, the central bank must use the money supply in the last 
period to pursue its price target objective.  That then determines  ] [ 1 T t p E -  where T is the last 
period, which then determines  ] [ 1 t t p E -  and pt in general. 
  Because the price levels are so determined by this terminal price level, the public’s 
confidence in the terminal price level is likely to diminish as T goes to infinity, possibly to the 
extent to make the value  ] [ 1 T t p E -  meaningless.  However, the central bank may be able to offset 
this diminishing public confidence by following a McCallum-Woodford rule or a Taylor rule.  
From a policy standpoint, this leads us to about the same conclusion as the previous literature on 
price indeterminacy concerning interest-rate targeting, except that the logic behind the 
conclusion differs. 
  When the central bank targets interest rates for a finite period followed by it targeting the 
price level or nominal-income targeting thereafter, prices are determined.  On the other hand, 
when the central bank targets interest rates for a finite period followed by it targeting inflation - 22 - 
thereafter, prices are indeterminate.  We infer from these results that short-term interest-rate 
targeting combined with intermediate-term or long-term price targeting or nominal-income 
targeting does determine prices, whereas short-term interest-rate targeting combined with 
intermediate-term or long-term inflation targeting does not determine prices.  The Taylor rule 
does not affect this price indeterminacy.  The McCallum-Woodford rule, however, does 
determine prices since it is a price-targeting rule. 
  Most central banks do pursue long-term objectives as they target interest rates in the short 
run.  This paper’s results indicate that if price stability is all that matters, then central banks 
should pursue price targeting rather than inflation targeting.  Since the Taylor rule is in terms of 
inflation, the central bank should not follow a Taylor rule, but follow something like a 
McCallum-Woodford rule instead. 
  On the other hand, Eagle and Domian (2003, and 2004) argue that the Pareto-efficiency 
of contracts implies that price stability is not all that matters.  In their models, Pareto-efficient 
consumption allocations are proportional to aggregate supply, which is appropriate when all 
consumers have the same risk aversion.  While they recognize aggregate-demand-caused 
inflation as bad, Eagle and Domian argue that aggregate-supply-caused inflation is good in that it 
makes the real payments on nominal contracts proportional to aggregate supply.  They therefore 
advocate nominal-income targeting over price targeting or inflation targeting.  This paper shows 
that prices are determined when a central bank targets interest rates in the short run and nominal 
income in the intermediate and/or long run.  A McCallum-Woodford rule modified for nominal-
income targeting, equation (25), may be needed to firm up the public’s confidence in the central 
bank targeting nominal income. - 23 - 
Appendixes 
A. The Central Bank Loss Function Switch: 
  Let xt be the instrument the central bank uses to conduct its monetary policy.  Let  ) ( t t x p  
be the function that represents the price level at time t as a function of xt.  Consider Sargent and 



















t p x p E d . Taking the derivative of the above 
with respect to xt gives: 









t t t t t
t x p p x p E d   (A1) 
If  ( ) [ ] 0 ) ( ) (
*
1 = ¢ - - t t t t t t x p p x p E for all t, then 




0 = ¢ - = ¢ - - t t t t t t t t t t t x p p x p E E x p p x p E for all t, implying (A1) equals zero.  
This shows that, technically, the central bank must take into account the derivative of the price as 
a function of the instrument in order to minimize Sargent and Wallace’s original loss function.  
However, if  ) ( t t x p¢  is a constant, then Sargent and Wallace’s original loss function implies the 
same central bank behavior as does the loss function in (11).  For sufficiently, small variations in 
the stochastic variables of the system,  ) ( t t x p¢  should be arbitrarily close to being constant.  If 
) ( t t x p¢  is not constant, then the central bank would set  ( ) [ ] . 0 ) ( ) (
*
1 = ¢ - - t t t t t t x p p x p E However, 
this would imply an optimal value for xt, which the public having rational expectations would be 
able to figure out.  They would then be able to figure out  )] ( [ 1 t t t x p E - , but they would need to 
know the joint probability distribution of all stochastic exogenous variables in the system. - 24 - 
B. The Theoretical Identification Error and the Velocity-Money-Demand Fallacy 
  Monetary economists tend to focus on the money demand function rather than velocity 
because of a belief that the money demand function is the reciprocal or inverse of velocity.  This 
section shows by a Robinson-Crusoe counterexample that this belief is false.  It also discusses 
that this false belief may have come about from a theoretical identification error or an 
inconsistency between some economists’ definition of the money demand function and the 
microeconomic definition of a demand function. 
Assume one infinitely-lived consumer who receives an exogenous endowment of the 
consumption good each period and who has perfect foresight.  The consumer maximizes his 




























c b   (A2) 
subject to 
) 1 ( 1 1 1 - - - + + + - £ + + t t
d
t t t t t
d
t t t i B M T y P B M c P   (A3) 
where b is the time preference discount factor, ct is the consumer’s consumption at time t, Pt is 
the price at time t of the consumption good, 
d
t M  is the consumer’s demand for money at time t, 
Bt is the consumer’s demand for one-period nominal bonds at time t, yt is the consumer’s 
endowment at time t, Tt is the consumer’s tax assessment at time t, and it is the nominal interest 
rate at time t.  The variables 
d M 0  and  0 B  are given as well as  t y  and  t T  for t=1,2,… . 
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W .  (Equation (A4) is for for t=2,3,…,¥, and equation (A5) is for 
t=1,2,…¥.)  The W
~
 is a permanent-income type of variable reflecting the present value of future 
after-tax income.  Note that  0




























, which implies that 


































b b .  Therefore, this money demand function (A5) is 
somewhat interest elastic. 
  Microeconomic principles imply that (A5) is the money demand function.  To argue that 
some other function is the money demand function is inconsistant with microeconomic 
principles.  Having agreed (hopefully) that (A5) is the money demand function, we now need to 
determine the structural velocity function.  We define the structural velocity function as the 
structural relationship between money demand and aggregate demand.  In this model, the 
structural relationship between money demand and nominal aggregate demand is  t t
d
t c P M = -1 .  
Since nominal aggregate demand in this Robinson-Crusoe economy at time t equals  t tc P , this 
says that the money demand of the previous period equals nominal aggregate demand of this 
period.  Note that this relationship is consistent with a cash-in-advance constraint.  The structural 







, which is a constant one.  That structural velocity is constant 
in a cash-in-advance constraint is well recognized. - 26 - 
Thus, the money demand function (A5), which is interest elastic, differs from the 
constant velocity function.  My reference in the body of the paper to (3) being the structural 
velocity function means that I am interpreting that function to be the structural relationship 
between money demand and nominal aggregate demand. 
We should not associate this paper’s argument as only being pertinent to an economy 
with a constant velocity.  Monetary economists have thought that the money demand function is 
the reciprocal of velocity.  We have shown by counterexample where the money demand 
function is not the reciprocal of the structural velocity function.  In models where velocity is not 
constant, the structural velocity function continues to differ from the money demand function. 
  Below I present the Cambridge argument, which is the most widely known argument as 
why the money demand function is the inverse of the money demand function.  While the 
Cambridge tradition is usually associated with this argument being applied for a constant 
velocity; many economists consider that it applies for a variable velocity as well and so I present 
the argument with a variable velocity.  This argument starts out with the equation of exchange: 
PY u V M = × ) , ( e
￿
  (A6) 
where M is the money supply, P is the price level, Y is aggregate supply, and  ) , ( e u V
￿
is the 
income velocity function of money.  This velocity can be a function of various endogenous and 
exogenous variables, represented by the vector u
￿
, and a stochastic error term e.  The Cambridge 
argument divides both sides of (A6) by  ) , ( e u V
￿










which can be referred to as the Cambridge k.  The result is: 
PY u k M × = × ) , ( e
￿
  (A7) 
The Cambridge argument calls (A7) the money demand function. - 27 - 
Often this Cambridge argument is associated with a constant velocity and hence 
according to the argument, the money demand function is interest inelastic.  Nevertheless, the 
argument depicted above is one that many textbooks give to explain why the money demand 
function is really the inverse of velocity,  
Where did the Cambridge argument make its logical flaw?  I have found two possible 
reasons:  First, it may have defined the money demand function in a manner that was 
inconsistent with microeconomic principles.  Second, it may have confused a reduced-form with 
a structural form. 
Identification errors can also be made in theoretical work as well as empirical work if we 
are not careful.  In particular, to avoid confusing reduced-form equations with structural ones, we 
must recognize that when we combine equilibrium conditions with other structural equations, we 
obtain reduced-form equations, equations that are only true in equilibrium.  Structural equations 
are true both in and out of equilibrium. 
  Suppose we have a demand function,  P Q
D 5 20- = .  This 
is a structural equation; it is defined both in and out of equilibrium.  
When we draw a demand curve such as in Figure 1, we draw it not 
only at the equilibrium point, but as a function of the price level; 
that function is defined for both disequilibrium and equilibrium 
values even though that demand curve might be a notional demand 
curve whose behavior assumes no shortages or surpluses.  However, in equilibrium, 
S D Q Q = .  
If we substituted this equilibrium condition into the demand curve, we get  P Q
S 5 20- = .  This 
latter equation is a reduced-form equation; it is not a structural equation; it is an equation that is 





Figure 1. Demand and 
supply curves defined both 
in and out of equilibrium - 28 - 





u V º ) , ( e
￿
 where Y
AD is real aggregate demand.  
Then 
AD d PY u V M º × ) , ( e
￿









º  and then write this as: 
AD d PY u k M × = ) , ( e
￿
  (A8) 
However, calling the above the money demand function is not consistent with microeconomic 
foundations.  The money demand function should be the relationship between money demand 
and one’s own income. .  Equation (A8) is the relationship between money demand and 
aggregate demand.  When people do spend money as reflected by nominal aggregate demand, 
that spending does in some sense result in other people receiving income.  However, the 
resulting income is someone else’s income, not the income of the individual demanding the 
money.  It is true that in equilibrium, aggregate demand equals income or aggregate supply.  
However, substituting income for aggregate demand converts (A8) into a reduced-form equation, 
an equation that is true only in equilibrium, not true out of equilibrium. 
 
C. Derivations of Demand Functions for Section B: 






t c b  subject 
to (A3) and 
d
t t t M c P 1 - = , which is the cash-in-advance constraint.  Substituting the cash-in-
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  (A9) 
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.  (A10) 
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B W b b , 
which implies the money demand function (A5).  Dividing this by Pt+1 gives the demand for the 
consumption good at time t+1, from which comes (A4). - 30 - 
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